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GMO Authorisations and The Aarhus Regulation: Paving The Way for 
Precautionary GMO Governance? 
 
 
Abstract 
This article endeavours to assess whether existing case law under the Aarhus Regulation has opened up any 
opportunities for civil society to challenge the decision that, in the face of scientific uncertainty, GMO risks meet 
the intended EU level of health and environmental protection. Against this backdrop, it seeks to establish whether 
the actions of NGOs under the Aarhus Regulation have resulted in any meaningful review of the Commission’s 
exercise of its discretion, in accordance with the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle and the aim of 
a high level of health and environmental protection. Upon an in depth analysis of the recent TestBioTech cases 
the article puts forward an argument for different evidentiary rules and a different standard of review in Aarhus 
Regulation case law, advocating a clearer distinction between ‘standard’ action for annulment and annulment of 
a decision to reject a request for internal review. This is argued to be the only way forward to breathe some life 
into the Aarhus Regulation’s provisions, ensuring some scrutiny of the level of protection achieved and nudging 
the Commission to take the precautionary principle seriously in the GMO field. 
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1. The Aarhus Regulation, The Notion of Socially Acceptable Risk and GMOs. 
 
An evidence-based and a socially acceptable risk approach coexist under EU risk regulation.1 
Under the former approach the results of technical risk assessment directly feed into risk 
management; little or no room for manoeuvre is thus left for risk managers to take scientific 
uncertainty, the precautionary principle2 or any of the other legitimate factors (‘OLFs’) at 
stake3 into consideration. The specific values at issue, the pervasiveness of the potential effects, 
                                                     
1 Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘The Fine Line Between Procedural and Substantive Review in Cases Involving 
Complex Technical-Scientific Evaluations: Bilbaína’ (2018) Common Market Law Review 55(4), 1217-1250; 
Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘The Glyphosate Saga and The Fading Democratic Legitimacy of European Union Risk 
Regulation’ (2018) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 1-25. For a different perspective on 
the coexistence of an ‘evidence-based’ and ‘precautionary’ soul under EU risk regulation see Alberto Alemanno, 
‘Risk Versus Hazard and The Two Souls of EU Risk Regulation: A Reply to Ragnar Lofstedt’ (2011) European 
Journal of Risk Regulation 2(1), 169-172. 
2 See first and foremost article 191(2) TFEU and European Commission, Communication from the Commission 
on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 final, at 12, 13 and 16. 
3 On the role of OLFs in EU risk regulation, see for instance recital (19) and articles 5, 6(2), 6(3) and 7(2) of the 
General Food Law (‘GFL’), Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 
January 2002 Laying Down the General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European 
Food Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety [2002] OJ L31. Article 6(3) 
maintains that ‘risk management shall take into account the results of risk assessment […], other factors legitimate 
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the intended level of protection in the field, public opinion or the availability and efficacy of 
risk management measures have no role to play; factors such as the advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the decision to run uncertain risks and their distribution across 
different constituencies are equally irrelevant.4 Evidence-based risk regulation in the EU draws 
on the dominant transnational legal narrative, whereby uncertain risks ought to be run as long 
as they have not been scientifically proved and established.5 
Under a socially acceptable risk approach, on the other hand, the decision to run uncertain risks 
and the enactment of risk management measures result from an iterative evaluation of all 
factors at stake.6 At the heart of this approach is the question whether uncertain risks are worth 
running in the light of scientific uncertainty, the intended level of protection pursued, the public 
health and environmental values at issue as well as all relevant advantages, disadvantages and 
distributional stakes.7 Under this approach, the presumption that uncertain risks ought to be run 
unless they have been positively proved does not apply. Rather, risk managers are called upon 
to make a convincing case that a product or process meets the intended level of protection and 
is safe enough for the ensuing risks to be socially acceptable and worth running, taking all 
factors into due consideration. 
Despite the gradual evidence-based shift in EU risk regulation, socially acceptable risk 
approaches are alive and well. The EU-wide battles of societal stakeholders and NGO actors 
are a testament to political and socio-economic contestation over the notions of ‘acceptable 
risk’ and ‘intended EU level of protection’. The GMO dilemma is probably the best 
exemplification of this tension between evidence-based and socially acceptable risk models, 
technocratic expertise and political and democratic legitimacy,8 hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic legal narratives on whether and how uncertain health and environmental risk should 
                                                     
to the matter under consideration, and the precautionary principle where the conditions laid down in article 7(1) 
are relevant […]’. 
4 More specifically, under evidence-based approaches to risk regulation, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) heuristics 
apply to the phase of risk management. Any detailed analysis of this aspect would go beyond the limited scope of 
this article; for more information see Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘GMO Risks, Food Security, Climate Change and 
the Entrenchment of Neo-Liberal Legal Narratives’ (2018) Transnational Legal Theory 9(3), 302-315. 
5 In this perspective see Maria Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’ (2009) Current 
Legal Problems 62(2), 242-285; Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘GMO Risks, Food Security, Climate Change and the 
Entrenchment of Neo-Liberal Legal Narratives’, supra no. 4; and Giulia Claudia Leonelli, The Transnational Law 
and Governance of GMOs (under peer review, on file with author). 
6 On ‘linear’ and ‘iterative’ approaches to risk regulation see Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Framing Risk Regulation: A 
Critical Reflection’ (2013) European Journal of Risk Regulation 4(2), 125-132. 
7 See also Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘The Glyphosate Saga and The Fading Democratic Legitimacy of European 
Union Risk Regulation’, supra no. 1. 
8 For the famous conceptualisation of their balance under EU risk regulation, see Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal 
Health SA v Council EU:T:2002:209. 
3 
 
be regulated in the EU.9 Despite legal reforms10 and repeated struggles to build multi-level and 
inter-institutional deliberative practices11 the GMO authorisation process is still, after almost 
twenty years since the enactment of the applicable regulatory framework, plagued by dissent 
and controversy. Whilst EU institutions have continuously pointed to the lack of positive 
scientific proof of health and environmental risks, civil society within and across EU Member 
States has repeatedly and consistently argued that the risks posed by agricultural 
biotechnologies are neither socially acceptable nor worth running. In this light, the GMO 
conundrum boils down to a substantive clash between evidence-based and socially acceptable 
risk approaches to the governance of agricultural biotechnologies. 
Internal review and access to justice under the Aarhus Regulation12 play a particularly 
important role in highly controversial cases, such as the one of GMOs. Unsurprisingly, over 
the past few years, these provisions have been repeatedly and increasingly deployed by NGO 
actors to challenge EU authorisations of GM varieties. Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation 
entitles NGOs to make a written request for internal review to the EU institution or body which 
has adopted an administrative act under environmental law or omitted to do so. The aim is to 
enable NGOs to challenge the decision of the EU institution, providing evidence that it should 
be reviewed. Yet, a decision to grant internal review does not necessarily result in the repeal 
or withdrawal of the administrative act; the EU institution or body may suspend it, amend it or 
request further scientific evidence.  
Article 12 states that NGOs whose request for internal review has been rejected may institute 
proceedings before the Court of Justice, in accordance with the relevant Treaty provisions; in 
other words, they may seek the annulment of the decision rejecting their request for internal 
review. In this case, NGOs will only challenge the decision taken through the administrative 
act indirectly. The object of the action for annulment is the decision rejecting the NGOs’ 
                                                     
9 See Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘GMO Risks, Food Security, Climate Change and the Entrenchment of Neo-Liberal 
Legal Narratives’, supra no. 4; in the same perspective see Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (Edward Elgar 
2008). 
10 Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 Amending Directive 
2001/18/EC as regards the Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs) in their Territory OJ [2015] L68/1. 
11 For a different reading of the GMO dilemma through the procedural perspective of ‘deliberative’ and ‘control’ 
models see inter alia Maria Weimer, ‘Risk Regulation and Deliberation in EU Administrative Governance - GMO 
Regulation and Its Reform’ (2015) European Law Journal 21(5), 622-640. 
12 Regulation (EC) No. 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community Institutions and Bodies, O.J. 2006 L 
264/13. 
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request for internal review, and the annulment of the latter does by no means lead to the 
annulment of the administrative act adopted under EU environmental law. 
On the one hand, the Aarhus Regulation provisions can reinforce and breathe new life into the 
political and democratic component of EU risk regulation, at a time when EU institutions have 
moved further down the road of technocratic evidence-based regulation.13 Giving NGO actors 
the power to request the internal review of GMO authorisations and enabling them to seek the 
annulment of the ensuing decision opens up new spaces for public participation, re-
democratising GMO governance in procedural terms.  
On the other hand, and focusing on the substantive outcome of the review process, the access 
to justice pillar of the Aarhus Regulation could provide no-profit actors with an opportunity to 
challenge the Commission’s determination of the intended level of protection, together with 
the regulatory decision that the uncertain risks posed by GMOs are worth running. By 
scrutinising the risk assessments conducted by EFSA, and by pointing to scientific gaps and 
persisting uncertainties, NGOs have an opportunity to argue that in light of the pervasive 
potential effects of GMOs, and taking all advantages, disadvantages and distributional stakes 
into consideration, the intended EU level of protection must be very high, the EU approach to 
GMO risk management must be precautionary, and scientific uncertainty must be dispelled in 
so far as possible. Against this background, societal actors can advocate a low threshold of 
acceptable risk in the GMO field. Through their requests for the internal review of GMO 
authorisations NGO actors can then challenge the evidence-based paradigm, pushing for 
further scientific evidence that GM varieties are safe enough for their risks to be socially 
acceptable. 
This article endeavours to assess whether existing case law under the Aarhus Regulation has 
opened up any opportunities for civil society to challenge the decision that, in the face of 
scientific uncertainty, GMO risks meet the intended EU level of health and environmental 
protection. In other words, it seeks to establish whether the actions of NGOs under the Aarhus 
Regulation have resulted in any meaningful review of the Commission’s exercise of its 
discretion, in accordance with the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle and the aim 
of a high level of health and environmental protection.14 
                                                     
13 On the technocratic shift of EU risk regulation, see inter alia Maria Weimer and Anniek de Ruijter (eds.) 
Regulating Risks in the European Union. The Co-Production of Expert and Executive Power (Hart Publishing, 
2017), and Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘The Glyphosate Saga and The Fading Democratic Legitimacy of European 
Union Risk Regulation’, supra no. 1. 
14 On the notion of ‘high level of protection’ see article 3(3) TEU, article 114(3) TFEU, article 168(1) TFEU and 
article 191(2) TFEU. See also the Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra 
no. 2, at 7 and 8. 
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Section 2 analyses the positive developments underlying the two TestBioTech – T-177/13 and 
T-33/16 – cases.15 Section 3 provides a concise overview of the evidentiary rules and standards 
of review applicable to judicial review of EU risk regulation, with a view to introducing the 
analysis of the following sections. Sections 4 and 5, on the other hand, explore the Court’s 
failure to take the precautionary principle and scientific uncertainty seriously in Case T-177/13. 
Against this overall backdrop, section 6 puts forward an argument for different evidentiary 
rules and a different standard of review in Aarhus Regulation case law, advocating a clearer 
distinction between ‘standard’ action for annulment and annulment of a decision to reject a 
request for internal review. This is argued to be the only way forward to breathe some life into 
the Aarhus Regulation’s provisions, ensuring some scrutiny of the level of protection achieved 
and nudging the Commission to take the precautionary principle seriously in the GMO field. 
 
 
2. Procedural Aspects And Admissibility of Actions Under Article 12 of The 
Aarhus Regulation. 
 
In case T-177/13 the Court rejected the Commission’s submission that the action was 
inadmissible in so far as the Aarhus Regulation does not allow for judicial review of the 
authorisation decision itself.16 In this case the three NGO applicants TestBioTech eV, European 
Network of Scientists for Social and Environmental Responsibility eV and Sambucus eV 
sought the annulment of a 2013 Commission’s decision,17 whereby their request for internal 
review of the authorisation of soybean MON 87701 x MON 89788 had been rejected. The 
Court refused the Commission’s interpretation of the NGOs’ action as an action for annulment 
of the GMO authorisation ‘through the back door’.18 As already mentioned, actions under 
article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation can only lead to the annulment of a decision rejecting a 
request for internal review. This, however, does not result in the annulment of the act which is 
the object of the request for internal review; the latter could only be challenged by applicants 
                                                     
15 Case T-177/13 TestBioTech eV and Others v European Commission EU:T:2013:736 (Appeal Case C-82/17 P, 
in progress), and Case T-33/16 TestBioTech eV v European Commission EU:T:2018:135. On 05/05/2017 (Case 
T-173/17, in progress) TestBioTech eV deposited a further application for the annulment of a 2017 Commission’s 
decision, whereby the latter rejected the NGO’s request for internal review of the authorisation of genetically 
modified soybeans FG 72, MON 87708 and MON 87705 x MON 89788. 
16 Case T-177/13, para. 41. 
17 Decision of the European Commission of 3 January 2013 Concerning the Review of Commission Implementing 
Decision 2012/347/EU of 28 June 2012 Authorising the Placing on the Market of Products Containing, Consisting 
of or Produced From Genetically Modified Soybean MON 87701 x MON 89788, O.J. 2012 L 171. 
18 Case T-177/13, para. 41. 
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meeting the standing rules of article 263 TFEU.19 Indeed, as the Advocate General pointed out 
in his Opinion, the internal review procedure itself targets administrative processes, without 
necessarily affecting their material outcome.20  
Furthermore, in case T-33/16, the Court aligned to a broad interpretation of ‘environmental 
law’ and ‘environmental protection’, straightforwardly rejecting the Commission’s claim that 
the internal review process and access to justice provisions laid out by the Aarhus Regulation 
should be limited to questions surrounding the ‘state of the environment’ and GM crop 
cultivation, as allegedly distinct from ‘public health’ matters and safety concerns on GM food 
and feed. In this case the NGO applicant TestBioTech eV sought the annulment of a 2015 letter 
from the Commissioner for Health and Safety, whereby the latter had refused the applicant’s 
request for internal review of the authorisation of Pioneer’s 305423 GM soybean.21 
Not only did the Court clarify that the distinction between ‘environmental’ and ‘public health’ 
protection is artificial and legally unfounded, in the landscape of EU environmental law.22 It 
also noted that the importation of GM varieties in the EU still implies that GM crops have been 
cultivated somewhere else; the environmental goals of the EU framework for the governance 
of GMOs, however, are not restricted ‘to the protection of the natural environment within the 
European Union’.23 Further than that, given that the use of GM feed may impact on animal 
health and welfare, authorisations of GM food and feed varieties cannot but fall within the 
remit of EU environmental law. This resulted in the annulment of the letter rejecting the 
applicants’ request for internal review. 
The Court’s reasoning in these two cases has marked a step forward in the acknowledgment of 
NGO rights under the Aarhus Regulation, doing justice to the procedural dimension of public 
participation and access to justice in the field of environmental law. What remains to be seen, 
as anticipated since the introductory section, is whether procedural access to justice may in 
fact enable NGOs to dispute the substantive outcome of their request for internal review. Has 
the Court fleshed out an adequate standard of review, with a view to scrutinising the 
Commission’s decision to reject a request for internal review? The next section introduces the 
notions which are relevant to answering this question, paving the way for the enquiry of the 
                                                     
19 See article 263 TFEU. 
20 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress) TestBioTech eV and Others v 
European Commission EU:C:2018:837, paras. 31, 39 and 40. EU institutions may then amend, suspend, withdraw 
or repeal acts adopted by them; see Case T-177/13, para. 44. 
21 Case T-33/16,  paras. 2 to 4. 
22 Case T-33/16, paras. 62 ff. 
23 Ibid., para. 66. 
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following sections. Sections 4 and 5 will then turn to a more in-depth analysis of case T-177/13, 
together with the specific grounds for the Court’s rejection of this action for annulment.  
 
 
3. Substantive Aspects: Burden of Proof, Standard of Review And The 
Commission’s Margins of Discretion. 
 
Any enquiry into the standards of review deployed in the field of EU risk regulation is 
intertwined with an analysis of the Commission’s margins of discretion in decision-making.24 
The Court of Justice has traditionally acknowledged that the Commission is endowed with 
broad discretionary powers in cases involving complex technical-scientific assessments; 
review by the Court must then be limited ‘to examining whether the institution committed a 
manifest error of assessment or misuse of power or manifestly exceeded the limits of its power 
of appraisal’.25 This has resulted in a deferential standard of scrutiny.26 The Court has 
throughout the years focused on assessing compliance with all relevant procedural conditions, 
and has carved out a narrow interpretation of ‘manifest error of assessment’. The Commission 
has traditionally been understood to incur a manifest error of assessment when its decision is 
found to be arbitrary and completely unsubstantiated; to this end, the Court will usually limit 
itself to an analysis of the overall rational coherence and consistency between the available 
evidence and the final measure.27  
The application of this deferential standard of review by the Court has aimed at safeguarding 
the boundaries of the Commission’s administrative discretion.28 Nonetheless, it has also 
opened up spaces for precautionary decision-making, enabling the Commission to enact 
                                                     
24 In the same perspective, see Christopher Anderson, ‘Contrasting Models of EU Administration in Judicial 
Review of Risk Regulation’ (2014) Common Market Law Review 51(4), 424-454. 
25 See Case C-331/88 Ex Parte Fedesa and Others EU:C:1990:391, para. 14; and Case C-157/96 Ex Parte 
National Farmers’ Union and Others EU:C:1998:91, para. 39. 
26 See inter alia Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v. Commission EU:C:1998:192; Joined Cases C-154 and 155/04 
Ex Parte Alliance for Natural Health and Others v. Secretary of State for Health EU:C:2005:449; Case C-326/05 
Industrias Químicas del Vallés v. Commission EU:C:2007:443; Case C-79/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e 
Servicos Lda v. Ministero della Salute EU:C:2010:803; Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Limited v. Secretary of 
State for Transport EU:C:2010:419; and Case C-15/10 Etimine v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
EU:C:2011:504. 
27 See for instance Case C-79/09 Gowan Comércio, paras. 46 and 71 ff. 
28 The aim is not the one of safeguarding or enhancing precautionary decision-making, as such. This is proved by 
the more stringent standard applied to the review of national precautionary measures. For the same view, see 
Christopher Anderson, ‘Contrasting Models of EU Administration in Judicial Review of Risk Regulation’, supra 
no. 26, 431 ff. 
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precautionary measures as long as it could rely on scientific uncertainty, scientific complexity 
and diverging risk assessments. 
In its full and authentic understanding, the precautionary principle applies when in the face of 
insufficient, inconclusive or imprecise scientific evidence it is impossible to determine with 
certainty the existence and extent of a risk, but the likelihood of real harm to the environment 
and public health persists;29 the risk manager is called upon to enact precautionary measures in 
so far as the uncertain risk may not meet the intended EU level of protection.30 Under the most 
common scenario, market actors meeting the standing criteria of article 263 TFEU have sought 
the annulment of precautionary risk regulation on the grounds that the Commission had failed 
to take into due consideration ‘sound’ scientific evidence, allegedly committing a manifest 
error of assessment. However, the Court’s acknowledgment of the Commission’s broad 
discretion and its non-intrusive standard of review has enabled the Commission to rely on 
prudential risk assessments, minority scientific opinions or persisting scientific uncertainty 
without incurring a manifest error of assessment. This has, albeit indirectly, safeguarded 
precautionary risk regulation at EU level. 
This situation has gradually evolved throughout the years, with the Court increasingly focusing 
on the technical-scientific studies substantiating the final measure and the specific scientific 
evidence relied upon by the Commission. This ‘scientification’ of judicial review31 has built 
on, and yet significantly expanded, the traditional evaluation of the plausibility of the final 
decision, and the assessment of whether the Commission complied with all relevant procedural 
guarantees.32 Specifically, the Court has expanded its review of whether the Commission 
complied with its duty to act diligently, whereby it is bound to examine ‘carefully and 
impartially all the relevant facts of the individual case […]’.33 Judicial review of the ‘relevant 
facts of the individual case’ that should have been taken into consideration in the final decision 
has thus resulted in an intrusive scrutiny of the scientific evidence relied upon by the 
                                                     
29 See inter alia Case T-13/99 Pfizer, paras. 140, 142, 144 and 160; Case C-333/08 Commission v France 
EU:C:2010:44, paras. 91, 92 and 93; and Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical, para. 61. 
30 See the Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra no. 2, in particular at 7, 8, 
9 and 12. See also the GFL, supra no. 2, recitals (8), (21) and (32) and articles 1(1), 5(1), 7(1) and 7(2). 
31 See Patrycja Dabrowska-Klosinska, ‘Risk, Precaution and Scientific Complexity Before the Court of Justice of 
the European Union’, in Lukasz Gruszczynski and Wouter Werner (eds.), Deference in International Courts and 
Tribunals (Oxford University Press 2014), 192-208, 205 ff. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See for instance Case C-691/15 P European Commission v. Bilbaína de Alquitranes SA and Others 
EU:C:2017:882, at para. 35, quoting Case C-269/90 Technische Universität München v. Hauptzollamt München-
Mitte EU:C:1991:438, para. 14; Case C-326/05 Industrias Químicas del Vallés, para 77; Case C-405/07 P 
Netherlands v. Commission EU:C:2008:613, para 56; and Case C-77/09 Gowan Comércio, para 57. For an in 
depth analysis of this point, see Giulia Claudia Leonelli, ‘The Fine Line Between Procedural and Substantive 
Review in Cases Involving Complex Technical-Scientific Evaluations: Bilbaína’, supra no. 1. 
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Commission. This has occasionally lead to a finding of manifest error of assessment, and to 
the annulment of the acts challenged by market actors.34 
This has marked a partial shift from a procedural, traditionally deferential standard of scrutiny, 
to a quasi-substantive standard,35 or ‘evidence-based judicial reflex’.36 This ‘quasi-substantive’ 
turn is, arguably, hard to reconcile with the balance between technical expertise and political 
legitimacy underlying EU risk regulation;37 were ‘sound’ scientific evidence all that EU 
institutions had to take into consideration, technical experts would have been entrusted with 
risk management and final decision-making powers. Further than that, a ‘quasi-substantive’ 
standard of review is arguably problematic in the light of the precautionary principle and 
overarching goal of a high level of protection in the EU. Nonetheless, this move has certainly 
come as welcome news for the advocates of evidence-based risk regulation; the latter have 
throughout the years argued in favour of narrowing down the Commission’s broad 
administrative discretion, advocating a thorough review of the scientific ‘soundness’ of EU 
risk regulation.38 
Against this overall background, the attempts to limit the Commission’s discretion and 
overcome the traditional procedural standard of review have so far gone hand in hand with an 
evidence-based perspective; in other words, EU acts have mostly been challenged for not being 
based on ‘sound’ science.39 What happens, however, in cases where a decision is challenged 
for not being precautionary enough, and for being grounded on non-prudential risk 
                                                     
34 See Case T-456/11 International Cadmium Association and Others v. Commission EU:T:2013:594, and Case 
C-691/15 P Bilbaína. 
35 For more details on this gradual, albeit discontinuous, shift towards ‘quasi-substantive’ review, see Giulia 
Claudia Leonelli, ‘The Fine Line Between Procedural and Substantive Review in Cases Involving Complex 
Technical-Scientific Evaluations: Bilbaína’, supra no. 1. 
36 Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of the Evidence-Based Judicial Reflex. A Response to Bar-Siman-Tov’s 
Semi-Procedural Review’ (2013) 1 Theory and Practice of Legislation, 1. 
37 Most famously, see Case T-13/99 Pfizer, para. 149. See also the Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary Principle, supra no. 2, at 15 and 21. 
38 See inter alia Alberto Alemanno, ‘Case C-79/09, Gowan Comércio Internacional e Servicos Lda v. Ministero 
della Salute, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010’ (2011) Common Market 
Law Review 48(5), 1329-1348; Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Science, Law and Politics of Neonicotinoids and Bees. 
A New Test Case for The Precautionary Principle’ (2013) European Journal of Risk Regulation 4(2), 191-207; 
Anne-May Janssen and Marjolein Van Asselt, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Court. An Analysis of Post-Pfizer 
Case Law’, in Marjolein Van Asselt, Esther Versluis and Ellen Vos (eds.), Balancing between Trade and Risk. 
Integrating Legal and Social Science Perspectives (Routledge 2013), 197-216; Anne-May Janssen and Nele 
Rosenstock, ‘Handling Uncertain Risks: An Inconsistent Application of Standards?’ (2016) European Journal of 
Risk Regulation 7(1), 144-154. More specifically, the advocates of evidence-based risk regulation have called for 
a thorough review of the margins of scientific uncertainty triggering precautionary action, and of the level of 
protection deemed appropriate by the risk manager. 
39 The opposite case – namely, the one of applicants challenging an EU act for not being precautionary – has been 
very rare. However – taking into consideration the stringent standing criteria of article 263 TFEU, and excluding 
the specific case of privileged applicants – it has been much easier for market actors producing or trading in 
hazardous products and processes to seek the annulment of EU acts, than it has been for NGOs and public interest 
groups.  
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assessments? How are we to interpret the ‘manifest error of assessment’ test, and what 
evidentiary rules should apply? How are we to outline the boundaries of the Commission’s 
discretion, in these cases? What happens in the specific instance of actions under the Aarhus 
Regulation, as structurally distinct from other actions for annulment? These questions lie at the 
heart of the TestBioTech cases. 
The crucial point emerging from case T-177/13 is the one surrounding the applicable 
evidentiary rules; it is thus unsurprising that the Advocate General’s Opinion is confined to the 
second ground of appeal, whereby the appellants lamented that the General Court erred in law 
in its application of the burden of proof.40 This aspect is, in turn, closely related to the issue of 
the standard of review deployed by the Court.  
In case T-177/13 the applicants argued that they were not required, when submitting their 
request for internal review,41 to prove that the modified soybean was not safe. Rather, they 
claimed that in so far as the scientific evidence they relied on raised legitimate and substantive 
doubts as to the safety of this GM variety, the burden of allaying any such concerns fell on the 
Commission.42 This argument reflects a socially acceptable risk approach: it challenges the 
presumption that uncertain risks should be run in so far as they have not been ‘soundly’ 
established, and hints at the regulator’s responsibility to persuade the public that a product or 
process meets the intended level of protection. The Court, however, reached the different 
conclusion that applicants must provide ‘a set of material raising serious doubts as to the 
lawfulness of the authorisation decision’.43 
This finding was complemented by the application of the traditional manifest error of 
assessment test, which obviously has a powerful impact on the framing of the burden of proof. 
The defendants in the case arguably feared an indirect review of the scientific evidence relied 
upon for the purposes of the authorisation; to put it differently, that the Court would question 
whether the controversial matters and scientific gaps highlighted in the applicants’ request for 
review warranted further consideration through the internal review procedure, in light of the 
overarching goals of the GM Food and Feed Regulation.44 However, building on the traditional 
acknowledgment of the Commission’s broad discretion in cases of complex scientific 
assessments, the General Court opted for the application of the ‘standard’ manifest error of 
                                                     
40 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 23. 
41 See supra, section 2, for some details on the case. 
42 Case T-177/13, para. 82. 
43 Ibid., see paras. 67 and 88 in particular. 
44 See paras. 72 to 76. 
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assessment test, stating that the evidence adduced by the applicant ‘must be sufficient to make 
the factual assessments used in the act implausible’.45  
The Advocate General reached the same conclusions in his Opinion. On the one hand, he 
emphasised the wide margins of the Commission’s discretion in cases involving complex 
technical-scientific assessments.46 On the other hand, focusing on the standard of proof for the 
applicants, he contended that a party seeking internal review ‘should provide concrete and 
precise arguments which might be able to call into question the factual position on which the 
authorisation decision is based’.47 Upon declaring that a ‘presumption of veracity, 
completeness and accuracy’ exists in respect of the authorisation decision,48 he clarified that 
any request for an intense and thorough internal review should be based on arguments and 
evidence that would call such presumption into question.49 
The next sections argue that the evidentiary rules and standard of review applied by the General 
Court and defended by the Advocate General deprive the access to justice provisions laid out 
in the Aarhus Regulation of any purpose. As the three NGOs maintained in their appeal to the 
Court of Justice, the General Court applied an ‘incorrect and impossible burden of proof’ on 
not-for-profit organisations and failed to take into consideration the NGOs’ claim that 
significant scientific gaps persisted in risk assessment.50  
The next section focuses on a range of complaints surrounding the interpretation and evaluation 
of scientific evidence that EFSA and the Commission had already taken into – some – 
consideration. Section 5 will then turn to a different set of complaints, pointing to scientific 
gaps in risk assessment and genuine scientific uncertainty; in these cases the applicants 
advocated further research by EFSA, claiming that the margins of scientific uncertainty and 
the potentially ensuing risks warranted further consideration by the EU institutions. In both 
instances, the evidentiary rules laid out by the Court and the application of the traditional 
manifest error of assessment test do not allow for any meaningful scrutiny of the Commission’s 
decision to reject the applicants’ request for a review of the GMO authorisation. 
 
                                                     
45 Paras. 77 and 78. In the same perspective, albeit with the aim of defending the Commission’s adherence to a 
precautionary approach, see the Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Case C-77/09 Gowan Comércio 
Internacional e Servicos v Ministero della Salute EU:C:2010:432, para. 74.  
46 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), paras. 55 and 56. 
47 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 52. 
48 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 52. The Advocate General explained this presumption 
on the – rather shaky – grounds that ‘it is in the very nature of these institutions [the Commission and EFSA] to 
be impartial’.  
49 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), paras. 52, 68 and 69. 
50 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 22 and paras. 57 and following. 
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4. GMOs And Manifest Errors of Assessment (I). Cases Where Scientific 
Evidence Had Already Been Taken Into Account. 
 
The applicants corroborated a number of their pleas and complaints by reference to evidence 
which had already been taken into some consideration throughout the GMO authorisation 
process. At the heart of these complaints lay a divergent framing and interpretation of the 
relevant scientific data and evidence; in other words, in their request for internal review and 
subsequent action for annulment, the applicants challenged the prudential nature of EFSA’s 
risk assessment51 and the Commission’s compliance with the precautionary principle in its 
exercise of risk management.52 This may be defined as an Upper Austria case53 scenario; a case 
where no ‘new’ scientific evidence is being adduced, and the controversy boils down to a 
straightforward disagreement over the notion of intended EU level of protection in the GMO 
field. In Upper Austria the Republic of Austria and the Upper Austria region sought the 
annulment of a 2003 Commission’s decision, rejecting their request for a derogation from the 
Deliberate Release Directive54 on the grounds of article 114(5) TFEU; at the centre of this 
famous case was a divergent interpretation of the notions of ‘acceptable risk’ and ‘intended 
level of environmental protection’ in light of all available scientific data, as already evaluated 
by EFSA throughout the environmental risk assessments stage. Indeed, as the Advocate 
General and the Court concluded in this case, the scientific report Austria and Upper Austria 
were relying on did neither provide any new scientific evidence on the contamination risks that 
GMO cultivation may pose in Upper Austria, nor any new data on the potential impact on 
specific local ecosystems.55 
In case T-177/13, the Court rejected all the complaints surrounding scientific evidence which 
had already been the object of some assessment by EFSA and the Commission. Unsurprisingly, 
the General Court held in various parts of the judgment that the applicants had not been able to 
prove any manifest error of assessment on the part of the Commission and had not provided 
any ‘new’ scientific evidence which could invalidate the Commission’s decision.  
                                                     
51 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra no. 2, 12 
to 14. 
52 Ibid., 15 and 16. 
53 Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05 Land Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission EU:C:2007:510. 
54 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate 
Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 
O.J L 106/1 (‘Deliberate Release Directive’). 
55 Ibid., paras. 56 ff. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Joined Cases C-439/05 and C-454/05 
Land Oberösterreich and Austria v Commission EU:C:2007:285, paras. 22 and 117-118. 
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Nonetheless, a closer look at the case testifies that the Commission had not in its decision dealt 
with or answered all of the applicants’ points in a satisfactory way. While the Commission 
convincingly answered the points raised in the first four parts of the first plea, substantiating 
its counter-arguments by reference to the risk assessment process, it merely dismissed some of 
the other complaints as unfounded, ignoring the scientific studies relied upon by the applicants 
and concluding that they were irrelevant or would not invalidate the final findings.  
In the second part of the first plea, the applicants adduced evidence that EFSA had allowed 
Monsanto to ‘base itself on the alleged slightness of the statistically significant differences 
across a broad cross-section of reference substances and on the ILSI database to mask the high 
number of statistical differences between the composition of the modified soybean and the 
composition of its conventional counterpart’;56 in other words, they claimed that Monsanto had 
generated a broad range of data to produce scientific noise and mask the differences between 
the GM soybean and its comparator.57 In its answer, however, the Commission clarified that 
reference varieties with a history of safe use ‘are not used to detect possible differences between 
the genetically modified plant and its conventional counterpart, as the applicants seem to imply. 
The statistical comparison between the genetically modified crop and its conventional 
counterpart is independent of the non-genetically modified varieties, so that no statistical noise 
exists, contrary to what the first applicant states’.58 On these grounds the Commission 
adequately disproved the applicants’ argument, allaying their concerns on any statistical noise 
vis-à-vis the finding of substantial equivalence. 
This did not occur, however, with many other points raised by the applicants. In the fifth part 
of the first plea, the applicants referenced scientific research showing that spraying with 
glyphosate and maintenance pesticides may have unintended effects when biotic or abiotic 
stressors intervene. Although observations on abiotic stressors had shown statistically 
significant differences in 9 cases of comparison, the Commission concluded that those cases 
were unproblematic and that the scientific literature presented by the applicants was irrelevant, 
as it referred to the cultivation of other varieties.59 The General Court found that the applicants 
had failed to produce sufficient material to establish that the Commission had committed a 
manifest error of assessment.60 In a similar vein, the Court argued that the applicants had failed 
to provide any new or relevant scientific evidence that would change the conclusions on the 
                                                     
56 Case T-177/13, para. 127. 
57 Ibid., para. 131. 
58 Ibid., para. 134. 
59 Ibid., paras. 159 to 168. 
60 See specifically paras. 165 to 168. 
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toxicity assessment of the GM variety, the selectivity of Cry proteins and the synergistic or 
combinatorial effects of glyphosate treatment, Bt toxins and Cry proteins under specific 
environmental conditions.61 The applicants lamented that the Commission had ignored the 
scientific studies they were relying upon,62 and that it had not meaningfully dealt with any of 
their specific criticisms.63 While agreeing that the Commission’s reasons were very succinct, 
in so far as they were limited to a finding that the scientific evidence provided no new 
information,64 the General Court held that the applicants had not been able to meet the burden 
of proof and demonstrate a manifest error of assessment.65 
Against this background, it is reasonable to conclude that whenever a divergent evaluation or 
interpretation of scientific evidence is at stake, NGO applicants will be caught in the Upper 
Austria slippery slope. Just like under Article 114(5) TFEU case law, or under the GMO 
safeguard clauses,66 they will have to provide ‘new’ and ‘significant’ scientific evidence on the 
risks posed by a GMO variety. If they are not able to do so, they will not have proved a manifest 
error of assessment; this will occur regardless of the Commission’s weak – or convincing – 
claim that their request for internal review was scientifically and legally unfounded, and that 
the scientific evidence adduced had already been taken into due consideration. 
This brief analysis sheds some light on the problems associated with the ‘standard’ manifest 
error of assessment test, as applied under the umbrella of the Aarhus Regulation. If the burden 
of proof is so high on the applicants, the latter will never be able to challenge the Commission’s 
determination of the intended EU level of protection, pushing for further evidence that GM 
varieties are sufficiently safe to comply with the EU threshold of acceptable risk. In so far as 
the applicants are expected to prove that the Commission made a manifest error of assessment, 
the Commission will be shielded from any duty to dispel public concerns, proving that the 
applicants’ request for an internal review of the GMO authorisation did not warrant any further 
consideration. This, however, directly contradicts the Advocate General’s acknowledgment 
that the competent institution should ‘demonstrate that the [NGOs’] argument[s] [are] clearly 
                                                     
61 Paras. 171 ff. 
62 Para. 194. 
63 Para. 211. 
64 Para. 205. 
65 Para. 216. 
66 See article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC (‘Deliberate Release Directive’), and article 34 of Regulation (EC) No. 
1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on Genetically Modified Foods 
O.J. L 268/1 (‘GM Food and Feed Regulation’). 
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unsubstantiated’,67 given that the internal review procedure ‘exists to establish whether there 
are elements that could have been overlooked in the course of the authorisation procedure’.68  
This burden of proof and standard of scrutiny can neither do justice to the socially acceptable 
risk approach, nor to the NGO applicants’ requests for internal review. As the next section 
shows, this is even clearer in cases of genuine scientific uncertainty and in the lack of specific 
risk assessments. 
 
 
5. GMOs And Manifest Errors of Assessment (II). Scientific Gaps and Cases of 
Genuine Scientific Uncertainty. 
 
A number of complaints in Case T-177/13 pointed to scientific gaps in EFSA’s assessment; in 
other words, the applicants lamented that EFSA had omitted to undertake specific risk 
assessments.69 By the fourth part of their second plea, the applicants submitted that the 
Commission had not addressed their point on the potential implications of processing the GM 
soybean; indeed, EFSA had not conducted any assessment of the effects of processing or 
cooking the GM variety.70 The Commission merely stated that, in light of the comparative 
biological analysis, no additional data were needed on the impact of processing. The Court 
found that the applicants had not provided any scientific evidence raising serious doubts as to 
the lawfulness of the authorisation, i.e. any scientific evidence supporting the argument that 
further analyses of the uncertain implications of processing would be needed.71 
Equally, in the third part of the second plea, the applicants highlighted that EFSA had omitted 
to require any assessment of the synergistic and combinatorial effects of spraying the GM 
soybean with glyphosate and maintenance pesticides; they further stressed that a finding of 
substantial equivalence of the GMO variety to its conventional counterpart cannot constitute a 
legitimate ground to omit all appropriate risk assessments.72 Upon arguing that toxicity 
assessments must be determined on a case-by-case basis, so that the possibility of a limited 
toxicity assessment should not be ruled out, the General Court reached the conclusion that the 
applicants in the case had not been able to demonstrate a manifest error of assessment in the 
                                                     
67 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 47. 
68 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 32. 
69 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 22 – referencing the five grounds of appeal. 
70 Case T-177/13, para. 221. 
71 Ibid., paras. 223 and 224. 
72 Ibid., para. 227. Indeed, it is worth underlining that the difference between the two lies at the heart of the EU – 
process-based – regulatory framework for the governance of GMO risks. 
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Commission’s examination and answer to their request for review.73 In other words, the Court 
ruled that the applicants had failed to scientifically prove why and how EFSA should have 
conducted a thorough toxicity assessment.   
Perhaps most worryingly, the same reasoning was applied to the applicants’ complaints on 
EFSA’s failure to investigate the effects of the GM soybean on the reproductive system, and 
the potential transfer of the GMO’s biologically active compounds to animal or human tissues 
through consumption.74 The Commission had rejected this point on the grounds that EFSA had 
not considered any specific endocrinological studies to be necessary, and that none of the 
studies referenced by the applicants had been soundly corroborated to date; the General Court 
reiterated that the applicants had not produced any scientific evidence challenging the 
Commission’s position, and had therefore not demonstrated a manifest error of assessment on 
its part.75 The same also occurred with the third plea,76 whereby the applicants lamented 
EFSA’s failure to conduct an assessment of the allergenic risks of the GM soybean for infants. 
Although this very omission breached the recommendations laid out in EFSA’s own 2010 
Scientific Opinion on Allergenicity, the Court still noted that EFSA had not found any further 
studies to be necessary; the applicants’ complaint, on the other hand, was rejected on the 
grounds that they had not proved any manifest error of assessment.77 
In these instances, the Court clearly got caught in a paradoxical line of reasoning. This set of 
complaints surround cases of structural scientific uncertainty and complexity, which the 
applicants considered would have warranted further consideration through the internal review 
process and a request to EFSA to conduct further assessments. In the lack of scientific data on 
the specific GM variety, and in so far as EFSA had not conducted all assessments, it was in 
fact impossible for the applicants to scientifically prove a manifest error of assessment – 
namely, that those assessments would be scientifically needed. All that the applicants could do 
was pointing to the margins of scientific uncertainty, as substantiated by different scientific 
studies and evidence on other GM varieties. Nonetheless, this was exactly the reason why these 
cases warranted further consideration through the internal review process;78 by pointing to 
significant scientific gaps and EFSA’s failure to conduct specific risk assessments, the 
                                                     
73 Para. 229. 
74 Para. 236 ff. 
75 Paras. 243 and 244. 
76 Paras. 258 ff. 
77 See paras. 271 to 274. 
78 In this respect, see supra no. 68 for a reference to the Advocate General’s acknowledgment that the internal 
review procedure ‘exists to establish whether there are elements that could have been overlooked in the course of 
the authorisation procedure’. 
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applicants put forward a compelling case in favour of internal review, arguing that the 
Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment in rejecting their request.  
On the other hand, the Court’s and Advocate General’s interpretation completely miss the 
point. Requesting the applicants to scientifically prove a manifest error of assessment, in the 
face of scientific uncertainty, is just like requesting regulators to scientifically prove the 
seriousness and extent of a risk, prior to taking any precautionary measures:79 this would make 
the precautionary principle nugatory. Indeed, as already mentioned, the precautionary principle 
applies when in the face of insufficient, inconclusive or imprecise scientific evidence it is 
impossible to determine with certainty the existence and extent of a risk, but the likelihood of 
real harm to the environment and public health persists.80  
Against this backdrop, the burden of proof on NGO actors is incorrect and impossible to meet 
in cases where significant scientific gaps persist in risk assessment.81 Yet again, this directly 
contradicts the Advocate General’s claims that ‘the burden of raising and presenting the issues, 
allocated to the party requesting review […], should not be too strict for the purposes of 
launching the internal review procedure’.82 
 
 
6. Advocating Different Evidentiary Rules And A Different Standard of Review: 
Legal Grounds and Precedents. 
 
As the last two sections have shown, the application of the ‘standard’ manifest error of 
assessment test within Aarhus Regulation case law will never result in any meaningful scrutiny 
of a decision to reject a request for internal review. For this reason, it will never enable NGOs 
to argue that in light of the potentially pervasive effects of GMOs, and taking all advantages, 
disadvantages and distributional stakes into consideration, the intended EU level of protection 
must be very high, the EU approach to GMO risk management must be precautionary, and 
scientific uncertainty must be dispelled in so far as possible.  
From this perspective, the manifest error of assessment test and the traditional acknowledgment 
of the Commission’s broad discretion in cases involving complex scientific evaluations deprive 
                                                     
79 The latter point was at the centre of the applicants’ – unsuccessful – arguments in Case T-13/99 Pfizer. See 
paras. 164 and 383 therein. 
80 See supra, no. 29. On the precautionary principle, as applicable to the GMO field, see Directive 2001/18/EC 
(‘Deliberate Release Directive’), recital (8) and article 4(1); and Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003 (‘GM Food and 
Feed Regulation’), recital (32) and article 1(a). 
81 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 22 and paras. 57 and following. 
82 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 50. See also para. 37 therein. 
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the Aarhus Regulation access to justice provisions of any real purpose. Whether or not the 
Commission’s arguments that all evidence has been taken into due account are substantiated, 
and whether or not significant scientific gaps persist in risk assessment, NGO applicants will 
only succeed in their action if they can positively prove a manifest error of assessment. Despite 
persisting scientific uncertainty, the Court will never truly assess whether the applicants’ 
request for internal review warranted further consideration; the applicants will neither have the 
opportunity to challenge the level of protection pursued in the GMO field, nor the 
Commission’s compliance with the precautionary principle in the exercise of its risk 
management functions. As a result, neither the notion of prudential risk assessment nor the 
overarching tenets of the precautionary principle are being taken seriously. 
The argument in favour of different evidentiary rules and a different standard of review goes 
to the heart of the evidence-based versus socially acceptable risk approach dichotomy. Should 
the uncertain risks posed by GMOs be run unless and until they have been scientifically 
established, or should risk managers put forward a convincing case that GMOs meet the 
intended EU level of protection? Crucially, should a decision to reject a request for internal 
review be annulled when NGO applicants have proved that a GMO is not safe, or when the 
Commission, in the face of persisting scientific uncertainty, has not been quite able to prove 
that it is safe enough? The General Court and the Advocate General undoubtedly took the 
former view.83 However, the latter scenario appears to be the only way forward to breathe some 
life into the Aarhus Regulation access to justice provisions. While this would mark a radical 
shift away from a deferential approach to the Commission’s margins of appreciation in 
precautionary risk governance, it would neither be a legally unfounded nor an unprecedented 
move. 
Starting from the legal grounds for this argument, it is worth underlining that both the General 
Court and Advocate General have drawn a distinction between judicial review of GMO 
authorisations, on the one hand, and judicial review of a decision rejecting a request for internal 
review, on the other. A clear difference exists between a ‘standard’ action for annulment and 
an action for the annulment of a decision rejecting a request for internal review. Whilst the 
applicants were indirectly challenging the lawfulness and merits of the GMO authorisation, the 
Court clarified that it would only be looking at the GM soybean authorisation in so far as this 
                                                     
83 For a similar evidence-based perspective, albeit in a different context, see Alberto Alemanno, ‘Case C-79/09, 
Gowan Comércio Internacional e Servicos Lda v. Ministero della Salute, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Second 
Chamber) of 22 December 2010’, supra no. 38, at 1344, arguing that scientific uncertainty should not legitimate 
precautionary action regardless of ‘when and by whom the scientific uncertainty requirement has been identified’. 
For the opposite view see Maria Lee, ‘Beyond Safety? The Broadening Scope of Risk Regulation’, supra no. 5. 
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could be relevant to a finding of lack of powers, infringement of essential procedural 
requirements, infringement of the Treaties or legal rules and misuse of powers in the 
Commission’s decision to reject their request for internal review.84 To put it differently, and 
as already explained, the annulment of a decision rejecting a request for internal review does 
not result in, and is structurally distinguished from, the annulment of the act which is the object 
of the request for internal review. 
The Advocate General explored this aspect in further detail in his Opinion. Whilst 
acknowledging the difference between ‘standard’ actions for annulment and actions for 
annulment under article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation, however, he did not elaborate further on 
it; in other words, he did not consider such difference to be relevant to the question of the 
applicable evidentiary rules and standard of scrutiny. Focusing on the substantive grounds for 
a request for internal review to be accepted, he noted that no precise criteria may be inferred 
from the wording of article 10.85 Turning to the intensity of the Court’s review in case of a 
subsequent action for annulment, he also found that article 12 does not provide any 
indications.86 In this light, he argued in favour of the traditional evidentiary rules and manifest 
error of assessment test, as applicable under ‘standard’ actions for annulment. 
While this position is certainly tenable, it does not do any justice to the structural differences 
between actions for annulment under article 263 TFEU and article 12 of the Aarhus Regulation; 
these should, arguably, reflect on the applicable burden of proof and standard of scrutiny.87 
From this different perspective, and focusing on the specific case of the annulment of a decision 
rejecting a request for internal review, it is legitimate to suggest that the legally relevant 
manifest errors of assessment88 ought to be the ones that the Commission may have committed 
in its decision that a request for internal review was unfounded and did not warrant further 
consideration. This opens up spaces for a teleological interpretation of the Aarhus Regulation 
access to justice provisions in light of the precautionary principle.89 In so far as the annulment 
                                                     
84 Case T-177/13, paras. 56, 59, 60 and 109. 
85 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 26. 
86 Opinion in Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), para. 54. 
87 In fact, there does not appear to be any reason to draw a distinction between the two forms of action for 
annulment if the applicable evidentiary rules and standard of scrutiny are exactly the same.  
88 On the notion of legally relevant manifest error of assessment see the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in 
Case C-343/09 Afton Chemical Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport, EU:C:2010:258, para. 30. 
89 In this respect, it is curious to note the Advocate General’s own acknowledgment that ‘the purpose of the internal 
review procedure is […] to reconsider the procedure that led to the authorisation decision, in order to check 
whether new information or the re-evaluation of known information might justify the revision of the authorisation 
decision. This purpose is perfectly in line with the precautionary principle in environmental law’; see Opinion in 
Appeal Case C-82/17 P (in progress), paras. 40 and 41. In this sense, the Advocate General has – indirectly – 
acknowledged that the internal review procedure and subsequent action for annulment, as provided for under the 
Aarhus Regulation, are an expression of the precautionary principle. 
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of a decision rejecting a request for internal review is different from the annulment of a GMO 
authorisation, the legally relevant manifest errors of assessment need not be the same which 
would make the GMO authorisation arbitrary or scientifically implausible; equally, the burden 
of proof need not be the – high – one which would have to be met by the applicants if they 
were seeking the annulment of the GMO authorisation.  
As the NGOs argued in case T-177/13 and in their appeal, a request for internal review should 
simply raise legitimate and substantive doubts as to the safety of a GM variety. If the request 
for internal review is rejected and the annulment of the relevant decision is being sought, the 
applicants should merely prove that the Commission committed a manifest error of assessment 
in deciding that, despite persisting scientific uncertainty, their request did not warrant further 
investigation;90 from this perspective, a failure to take controversial scientific evidence into 
due consideration and a failure to conduct substantial safety assessment should certainly lead 
to a finding that manifest errors of assessment were committed in the decision to reject the 
applicants’ request. Symmetrically, the Commission should be able to show that the request 
did not warrant further consideration, as all scientific evidence had already been taken into due 
consideration and all risk assessments had been exhaustively conducted by EFSA; ultimately, 
the Commission should be able to make a convincing case that the internal review procedure 
was unnecessary. 
This different interpretation lowers the requisite legal standard for NGO applicants to prove a 
manifest error of assessment, re-distributing the burden of proof between the applicants and 
the Commission; a fairer balance could thus be struck between the applicants’ duty to 
scientifically substantiate their claims on GMO risks and the Commission’s duty to dispel 
scientific uncertainty and allay societal concerns. Drawing a more subtle and arguably clearer 
distinction between ‘standard’ actions for annulment and actions under the Aarhus Regulation 
could then pave the way for a different understanding of the manifest error of assessment test, 
re-interpreting the Aarhus Regulation access to justice provisions in light of the precautionary 
principle. By scrutinising the risk assessments conducted by EFSA, and by pointing to 
scientific gaps and persisting uncertainties, NGOs would have a real opportunity to request 
further scientific evidence that GM varieties are safe enough and challenge the decision that, 
in the face of scientific uncertainty, GMO risks meet the intended EU level of protection and 
are socially acceptable.  
                                                     
90 Indeed, the Court underlined that the applicants’ pleas in law should have only targeted the Commission’s 
decision to reject their request for internal review – rather than the underlying GMO authorisation process and the 
Commission’s authorisation decision. See Case T-177/13, paras. 59 and 60. 
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Not only would this nudge the Commission to take the precautionary principle seriously;91 it 
would also, and crucially, do justice to the NGO applicants’ claims. As the Court increasingly 
embraces a ‘quasi-substantive’ standard of scrutiny, it is unclear why a deferential, procedural 
standard of review and a narrow application of the manifest error of assessment test should 
operate in cases under the Aarhus Regulation. If the Court has come to thoroughly scrutinise 
the scientific evidence relied upon by the Commission, and if the boundaries of the 
Commission’s administrative discretion have been correspondingly narrowed down, then 
compliance with the precautionary principle and the pursuit of a high level of protection should 
be equally reviewed. In this perspective, the overarching tenets of the precautionary principle 
should act as a constraint on the Commission’s discretion, when deciding to reject a request for 
internal review under the Aarhus Regulation.  
Secondly, turning to the issue of precedents, it is worth noting that the Court took a similar 
perspective in the Paraquat – T-229/04 – case.92 In this case the Kingdom of Sweden sought 
and succeeded in obtaining the annulment of Commission Directive 2003/112/EC,93 
authorising the use of paraquat as an active substance. Sweden alleged the infringement of a 
range of procedural provisions, suggesting that scientific evidence had not been taken into due 
consideration by the Commission, as well as breaches of substantive legal provisions, the 
precautionary principle and the principle that a high level of environmental and public health 
protection must be ensured in the EU.94 
The first set of pleas in Paraquat brings us back to the case of a divergent framing and 
interpretation of the relevant scientific data.95 Indeed, the Commission argued in its defence 
that all the evidence adduced by Sweden on the potential link between the use of paraquat and 
the development of Parkinson disease had already been taken into account throughout the 
authorisation process;96 in other words, Sweden was not relying on any ‘new’ scientific 
evidence. Whilst some specific procedural irregularities could be identified in the processing 
of the paraquat dossier, the Court suggested – at a more general level – that the Commission 
                                                     
91 See the Court’s own – theoretical – acknowledgment that the Commission is bound by the precautionary 
principle at paras. 86, 87, 104, 105 and 106 of Case T-177/13. 
92 Case T-229/04 Sweden v Commission EU:T:2007:217. See also Christopher Anderson, ‘Contrasting Models of 
EU Administration in Judicial Review of Risk Regulation’, supra no. 24. 
93 Commission Directive 2003/112/EC of 1 December 2003 Amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC To Include 
Paraquat As An Active Substance, O.J. L 321, no longer in force. 
94 Case T-229/04 , para. 54. 
95 See supra section 4. 
96 Case T-229/04, paras. 83 to 88 and 96-97. 
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had in fact failed to take some controversial scientific evidence referenced by Sweden into due 
consideration.97 This resulted in Sweden’s plea being accepted. 
The second set of pleas, on the other hand, pointed to scientific gaps in the risk assessment.98 
Sweden argued that the Commission, in the face of persisting uncertainty, had not put forward 
any convincing scientific case that the acceptable operator exposure level (‘AOEL’) would be 
met and that the use of paraquat would not pose serious risks to animal health. Thus, it 
contended that the Commission had not substantiated its claim on paraquat’s safety to the 
requisite legal standard, breaching both the precautionary principle and the principle that a high 
level of protection must be achieved.99 The Court accepted Sweden’s contention, arguing that 
Directive 91/414100 must be interpreted in light of the precautionary principle and that the 
Commission should have ‘established beyond a reasonable doubt that the restrictions on the 
use of the substance involved make it possible to ensure that use of that substance will be in 
accordance with the requirements laid out [in the Directive]’;101 it also considered that Sweden 
had relied upon ‘solid evidence which may reasonably raise doubts as to the safety of 
paraquat’.102 
To draw some conclusions, in Paraquat the Court took the view that the Commission had not 
rebutted Sweden’s arguments, allaying Member States’ concerns and persuading them of 
paraquat’s safety. This sheds further light on the socially acceptable risk line of reasoning 
which has been advocated in this section, beyond the evidentiary rules laid out in case T-177/13 
and the manifest error of assessment test. From this perspective, Paraquat substantiates the 
claim that a different standard of scrutiny could be developed and applied to Aarhus Regulation 
case law. 
 
 
7. The Way Forward: The Case For Precautionary GMO Governance. 
 
Making sure that the voice of NGO applicants and civil society is heard is all the more 
important in the politically and socio-economically contested case of agricultural 
biotechnologies; indeed, all latest actions under the Aarhus Regulation have targeted decisions 
                                                     
97 Case T-229/04, paras. 102 to 126. 
98 See supra section 5. 
99 Case T-229/04, paras. 139 ff. 
100 Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 Concerning The Placing of Plant Protection Products on The 
Market, O.J. L 230, no longer in force. 
101 Case T-229/04, paras. 170 and 227. 
102 Ibid., paras. 181 to 185. 
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rejecting a request for internal review of GMO authorisations. Societal stakeholders, consumers 
and citizens at the national and EU-wide level have repeatedly made the point that the uncertain 
risks posed by GMOs are not worth running; the Commission, however, does not seem inclined 
to take the notions of socially acceptable risk and precautionary risk governance seriously. In 
this sense, as already explained, the governance of GMOs epitomises an unresolved 
disagreement over the boundaries and scope of the notion of ‘acceptable risk’. 
As new techniques of genetic manipulation are developed and new sources of uncertain risks 
emerge,103 paying due regard to NGO applicants and public opinion will get increasingly 
important. Access to justice under the Aarhus Regulation could then play a key role to revive 
a socially acceptable risk approach to GMO governance, helping NGOs challenge the 
presumption that uncertain risks must be run as long as they have not been scientifically proved. 
Against this backdrop, and in this perspective, it is to be hoped that the Court of Justice will 
accept the appellants’ pleas in law, setting aside the Judgment of the General Court and 
annulling the Commission’s decision. 
Fleshing out an appropriate standard of review in cases under the Aarhus Regulation will 
certainly prove challenging. Nonetheless, a fairer balance should be struck between the 
Commission’s margins of discretion, on the one hand, and the public interest rationale 
underlying the Aarhus Regulation, on the other. To this end, due consideration should be given 
to the special nature of the actions under Article 12 and to the precautionary principle and 
pursuit of a high level of protection, as enshrined in the Treaties. 
No amount of precaution will ever make the scientific evidence adduced by the applicants 
‘new’, as Advocate General Sharpston noted in her Opinion in Upper Austria;104 nor will it 
enable the applicants to scientifically prove a manifest error of assessment, as traditionally 
understood.  
However, the time has come to carve out a new interpretation of legally relevant manifest errors 
of assessment, paving the way for a genuine debate on precautionary GMO governance. The 
time is ripe to get back to the democratic and political foundations of EU risk regulation, 
beyond ‘sound’ science.105 
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